It has been proved earlier that the existence of bit commitment schema (blobs) implies the existence of sereknowledge proofs of information possession, which are MA-protocols (i.e. the verifier sends only independent random bits) [BrChCr], [GoMiWi]. In this paper we prove the converse result in a slightly modified form: We define a concept called veoHy zero-knowledge, which is like ordinary zero-knowledge, except that we only require that an honed verifier learns nothing from the protocol.
now compute a commitment as BC(b,r) = r2 mod n, where r is a randomly chosen residue with Jacobi symbol -Ib. In this case, commitments to 1 have exactly the same distribution as commitments to 0, but knowledge of two square roots of a number modulo n with different Jacobi symbols clearly suffices to factor n. Hence, even with infinite computing power, b cannot be found from BC(b,r), but A could cheat if he had computing power enough to factor n before it was "too late", i.e. before the whole protocol is completed.
Commitment schemes are extremely useful in the construction of cryptographic protocols. The general zero-knowledge proof of [GoMiWi] and [BrChCr] as well as the multiparty computation protocols of [ChDaGr] and [GoMiWi2] are based entirely on commitment schemes.
The existence of bit Commitments is implied by the existence of one-way functions, as shown by Naor "a]. The converse, however, is not necessarily true, even if we exclude from the discussion commmitments that are not binary encodable, like quantum blobs [Br] for example: In the present paper, we base commitments on problems for which one can select hard instances at random. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the problem is in any sense "hard on the average". This adds to the interest of studying bit commitments in general and their connection to zero-knowledge protocols. Another difference to the work of Naor is that our construction has the potential of producing commitments secure against an infinitely powerful receiver (which implies that the sender MD. cheat if he has enough computing power). The commitments from "a] has the dual property: the sender cannot cheat at all, while the receiver must be restricted.
The protocols we will be concerned with here are protocols for proving possession of information (rather than proving language membership as in the original zeroknowledge paper [GoMiRa] ). In this setup, a prover P (Peggy) possesses a solution to some problem, and tries to convince a verifier V (Vic) that indeed she knows this solution, while giving Vic absolutely no clue as to what the solution is. A little more formally: suppose a relation R on sets U and V , and an element y E V are given. Then Peggy is trying to convince Vic that she knows how to compute z E U such that (z,y) E R holds.
Following [FiFiSh] and [ToWo] , we will let both the prover and the verifier be probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines.
In this model, it was proved in [BrChCr] that the existence of a bit commitment scheme implies the existence of a zero-knowledge proof of information possession (as defined in [ToWo] ) for any problem in MA, i.e. for any problem, Peggy can prove to Vic in zero-knowledge that she knows a solution, as long as this solution can be verified by a BPP-algorithm. Furthermore, Vic only has to send independently chosen random bits, i.e. the protocol is an MA-protocol. Our result can be seen a sort of converse to the above: if a (weakly) zero-knowledge proof of knowledge exists for some hard problem, and the protocol has a structure similar to that of [BrChCr] , then a bit commitment scheme exists.
In independent work, Fiege and Shamir [Fish] found a result similar to ours for the special case where the verifier sends only 1 bit per round. This was used to design two-round zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for any NP-problem. The key observation there was that commitments constructed by our method are always "chameleonn, i.e. the bit contained in a commitment can always be changed if extra information is known. One can then simulate parallelized protocols by making this information available to the simulator.
We would like to point out two interesting facts about our result:
0 It adds a theoretical basis to the intuitive belief shared by many reaearchers, that bit commitment schemes are very fundamental objects ideed, and if they do not exist, zerGknowledge proofs of knowledge -at least interesting onesare probably, to use an expression of Brassard, a fancy way of talking about the empty set 2.
Put another way: it shows that zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge based on bit commitments are "as invulnerable as possible" against collapse of cryptographic assumptions: if the assumption falls, no interesting objects exist of the kind we are trying to construct.
0 It shows that existence of an MA zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for one hard problem is a sufficient condition for the existence of such proofs for anything in MA (by [BrChCr] ), even if the problem we start with is not NP-complete.
The restriction to MA-protocols does not seem to be a severe limitation of the result: the most powerful zero-knowledge proof known ( [BrChCr] , [GoMiWi] ) are MA. Furthermore the result is not limited to MA-protocols, as shown by Section 3.
Main Result
In this extended abstract, we w i l l only give informal definitions and proofs. For a rigorous definition of zero-knowledge proofs of information possession, and a detailed description of communicating Turing machines, the reader is referred to [ToWo] .
We now describe a proof system of information possession for a relation R on sets X and Y: It consists of a pair of communicating probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines (P,V). Common input to P and V is y E Y. P also gets as input 2 E X .
At the end of the conversation, V outputs "accept" or "reject", and the proof system (P, V ) is said to accept or reject accordingly. Let m denote the length in bits of y.
We will restrict our attention in this section to the case of MA-protocols, i.e. the prover speaks fist, and the verifier sends only uniformly and independently chosen bits.
Thus, we assume that the conversation between P and V has the following form:
0 P sends a message ml.
*Zer*knowledge prooh of knowledge do exist for some problems independently of computational assumptions, examplea are discrete log, graph isomorphism, and factoring. However if bit commitments did not exist, all these problems would be easy, and their interactive proofa therefore uninteresting.
e P sends a message m2. 0 V decides, based on ml, m2, &, ..., bk whether to accept or not.
We assume for simplicity that k-is constant as a function of m. For generalizations of this, see the remarks after Theorem 1.
We require about (P, V ) that: 0 For the verifier's protocol V , there exists a simulator (a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine), Mv, which (with the help of V ) simulates the conversation between P and V , such that the output of MV is plynomially (in m) indistinguishable from the real conversation between P and V . Loosely speaking, this means that a polynomial time algorithm cannot guess essentially better than at random whether a given conversation was produced by Mv by (P, V ) . Thus we only require that an honest verifier learns nothing from the protocol.
0 For any prover's protocol P', there exists an interrogator (a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine), M p -, which (with the help of p') tries to compute
x E X such that (z,y) E R. We require that there is a constant e < 1 such that
Prob((P*, V ) accepts A N D M p fails) 5 c,
for all s d c i e n t l y large rn. This is the definition proposed in [ToWo] . A very similar -but technically slightly different -definition appeared in [FiFiSh] .
If these 3 conditions are satisfied, ( P , V ) is called a weakly zero-know2edge proof 6 is called the error probability of (P, V ) .
We can now state the main result:
system of information possession.
Theorem 1
Suppose there exists a binary relation R with the following properties:
It is easy to select y such that an z with (z,y) E R exists, but such that computing one is a hard problem. Further, given z and y, it is easy to check, whether ( z , y ) is in R.
0 R admits a weakly zero-knowledge proof system of knowledge with error probability E, where the conversation is of the form described above.
Then there exists a bit commitment scheme with the properties described in Section 1. If the proof system is perfect zero-knowledge, then the commitment scheme constructed is secure against an infinitely powerful receiver, i.e. commitments to 0 have the same distribution as commitments to 1.
Remarks
Note that the proof system would be uninteresting, if the first condition above was not satisfied: it does not make much sense for P to try to keep her solution to the problem secret, if V could just compute a solution himself! Also in this case, the existence of an interrogator becomes trivial: Mp can just compute the solution by itself, without ever talking to P'. The assumption about selectability of y is closely related to the notion of inarlnerable generators. [AABFH] contains the first study of the theory behind this notion, and the results are improved in [FLM] .
As mentioned, we assume that k, the number of challenge bits pr. round, is constant as a function of m. The Theorem could be proved in much the same way ( m ) ) and we assume that e = O(7n-l). With this extension, the result covers all known MA zero-knowledge proofs of information possession.
Proof
We first describe loosely the basic idea of the proof We will have two players, A who will create commitments, and B who receives them. The idea is that A w i l l create and send to B the start of a conversation between P and V. To open a commitment, A sends the rest of the conversation. B accepts this, if V would have accepted, based on the conversation given.
If A does not know a solution to the problem instance in question, this impliea to some extend a commitment: by the properties of (P, V), A is unable to complete the conversation with respect to all possible values of the challenge bits b, ..., bh. He is therefore "committed" to the set of values for b, ..., bk for which he can complete the conversation. The rest of the proof consists of technical lemmas and tricks that amplify this into a regular commitment scheme.
Let t be the smallest integer, such that c* < 1/2. By Lemmas 2 and 3 in [ToWo] , the proof system that consists of t iterations of ( P , V) is weakly zero-knowledge and has error probability 2. Let (I", V') denote this proof system. We let denote the conversation produced by the i'th iteration of (P,V). To open the commitment, A releases the entire Anversation produced in step 2, and B checks that V would have accepted, had it been given this conversation. He then determines u as in step 4, and determines the bit A was committed to a s b = u @ c .
We can now prove the following about quasi bit commitments: On input a real conversation, this produces output 1 with probability 1/2, since in this case there is no correlation between the mi-values and b. On the other hand, the output is 1 with probability p if the input is simulated. By assumption p -1/2 is non-negligible, contradicting the assumption that Mv is a good simulator.
Clearly, if (P, V ) is perfect zero-knowledge, p = 1/2, and QBC(b,r) contains no information about b.
Secondly, suppose by contradiction that given y, with non-negligible probability We adopt the standard complexity theoretic definition of "non-negligible" and assume that q 2 l/Q(rn) for some polynomial Q and all sufficiently large m.
Consider now the prover P ' with the following strategy: before sending its fitst message, it runs mQ(m) times whatever method A has for producing sets of conversations as above. If at least one try was successful, it uses the mf produced by this try in the i'th iteration of (P, V ) . Otherwise, it sends randomly chosen messages.
Clearly,
Since the first factor is exponentially close to 1 for large rn, the acceptance probability larger than 1/2 for all sufficiently large rn. Further, since we assume that finding a i.e. A can convince B about at most 1 value for 6. solution z to (2, y) E R is a hard problem, and P" only gets y as input, we may assume that any interrogator Mp= fails to find z with probability essentially 1. Hence,
Prob(Mp f a i l s AND (P',V') accepts) N Prob((P',V') accepts) > 1/2,
for all sufficiently large rn, contradicting the assumption that 8 < 1/2.
mitted with probability at least Thus we may assume that for each quasi commitment A creates, he will be comwhich is a constant, since k and t are constants.
commitments to build ordinary ones:
The rest of the proof is concerned with a protocol construction that uses quasi bit 1. The receiver of the commitment B chooses some y E Y according to the first condition in Theorem 1, and sends it to A.
2.
To commit to a bit b, A creates rn quasi commitments to b,
3. To open the commitment, A reveals b and opens all the quasi commitments. B accepts this if and only if A opens all the quasi commitments correctly.
To prove that this constitutes a bit commitment scheme, we must first argue that B cannot predict b from QBC(b, r l ) , ..., QBC(b, rm) essentially better than at random.
This follows from the fact that b cannot be guessed from 1 quasi commitment to b. The argument is completely similar to a corresponding one for probabilistic encryptions (see [GoMi] ), and we w i l l not repeat it here (of course, the argument becomes trivial if (P, V) is perfect zero-knowledge). Secondly, we must prove that A is committed with large probability. Since 1 quasi commitment commits A with probability at least p , rn quasi commitments will commit A with probability at least 1 -(1 -p)", which converges exponentially to 1 as a function of m 0
Corollary
Suppose the binary relation R satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1. Then there exists a zero-knowledge proof of information possession for any binary relation S for which (z,y) E S can be verified efficiently.
Proof
Use R and Theorem 1 to construct a bit-commitment scheme. Represent the verification procedure for S a s a (polynomial size) Boolean circuit, and use the protocol from [BrChCr] with the bit-commitment scheme just constructed0
As an example of a protocol satisfying our conditions; consider the following p r e We are given a prime p , a generator g of Z;, and y E 2;. The prover claim to tocol for proving possession of a discrete log, first found by [ChGr] :
know 5 , such that 8 = y mod p . She convinces V as follows:
1. P chooses t at random, and sends c = gz to V . It is well-known that this constitutes a zero-knowledge proof system of information possession with c = any constant larger than 1/2.
V chooses
The resulting bit commitment scheme is the following: A is given y, but not its discrete log. Commitments are computed as follows:
BC(1,r) = gr rnodp, BC(0,r) = yg'modp This commitment scheme is well known, and was introduced in [ChDaGr] , and independently in [BoKrKu] . [ToWo] give similar protocols for any random self-reducible relation, which shows that any random self-reducible relation representing a hard problem can be used as basis for a bit-commitment scheme.
Non MA-protocols
It is an open question whether our result can be proved for any zero-knowledge proof of information possession. But as shown by the following, there is a subclass of non-MA protocols for which our result does hold.
Consider proof systems where the conversation has the following form:
0 V does some computation and sends a message rnl to P.
0 P sends a message m2.
V decides whether to accept or not

Theorem 2
Suppose the binary relation R satisfies 0 It is easy to select y such that an z with ( 5 ,~) E R exists, but such that computing one is a hard problem.
R admits a weakly zero-knowledge proof system of knowledge.
0 The conversation has the form given above, and there is a one-one correspondence between initial messages m l and messages m 2 that will make V accept.
0 As a function of rn, the error probability vanishes faster than any polynomial fraction.
Then there exists a bit commitment scheme as defined in Section 1.
proof Suppose rnl and m2 are in sets MI and M2, respectively. Then the verifier's decision procedure defines a function f : M2 + Ml, such that f ( r n 2 ) = rnl precisely if V accepts. Since the error probability is negligible, f is hard to invert almost everywhere, but since the protocol is sirnulatable, it is feasible to produce rnl,rn2 such that f ( r n 2 ) = ml (note that this is not necessarily the same as saying that f(m1) is easy to compute given ml).
Using Yao's Xor-Theorem (see for example [Kr] ), one can then from f construct a function f' with similar properties, but such that f' has ua hard bit", i.e. given f ' ( x ) , there is a particular bit of x which cannot be guessed essentially better than at random by a polynomial time algorithm. From this, it is straightforward to construct a bit commitment schemen Remark: We have assumed the 1-1 correspondence between nl's and m2's mainly for simplicity. For our purposes, it would actually s d c e if f mapped a constant number of elements to 1. Also, we could of course tolerate a non vanishing error probability by iterating the proof system many times. Note also that the recent work by [ G o b ] may make it possible to generalize the result even further.
An example of a protocol of this kind: suppose n = pq, where p and q are primes congruent to 3 modulo 4. P knows the factorization of n, and so he can compute square roots modulo n. We then do the following:
1. V chooses x at random and sends x4 mod n to P 2. P computes and sends to V c = x2 mod n -note that although x4 has 4 square roots modulo n, exactly one of them is itself a square, by the properties of p and q.
3. V accepts, iff 2 = x4 mod n.
We leave it to the reader to show that this protocol satisfies all the conditions given in this section, assuming that factoring is hard.
Note that the protocol is weakly zero-knowledge, but not ordinary zero-knowledge: a cheating verifier can factor n after 1 interaction with P by sending a square for which he knows a square root of Jacobi symbol -1.
The function constructed from the protocol is of course f(x) = x 2 n o d n, which is a permutation of the quadratic residues modulo n, and is hard to invert, if factoring n is hard. In this case, Yao's Xor Theorem is not necessary to obtain a bit commitment scheme -it is known that guessing the least significant bit of x from f(z) is polynomially equivalent to factoring ra [ACGS] .
